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Abstract: Bluetooth is the technology that utilizes radio frequency waves as a way to communicate 
wirelessly between digital devices. The Bluetooth user has the choice of point-to-point or point-to-
multipoint  links  whereby communication can be held between two devices, or up to eight. When 
devices are communicating with each other they are known as piconet, and each device is designated 
as a  master  unit or  slave unit, usually depending on  who initiates the connection. However, both 
devices have the potential to be either a master or a slave.  We have given the analysis of denial of 
service attack in the bluetooth technology. And describe the proposed solution for this attack by the 
use of security manager. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Bluetooth  is  an  always-on,  short-range  radio 
hookup  that  resides  on  a  microchip.  It  was  initially 
developed by Swedish mobile phone maker Ericsson in 
1994 as a way to let laptop computers make calls over a 
mobile phone. Since then, several thousand companies 
have signed on to make Bluetooth the low-power short-
range  wireless  standard  for  a  wide  range  of  devices. 
Industry observers expect Bluetooth to be installed in 
billions of devices by 2007.  
The concept behind Bluetooth is to provide a universal 
short-range  wireless  capability.  Using  the  2.4  GHz 
band, available globally for unlicensed low-power uses, 
two Bluetooth devices within 10 m of each other can 
share  up  to  720  Kbps  of  capacity
[1].  Bluetooth  is 
intended to support an open-ended list of applications, 
including  data  (such  as  schedules  and  telephone 
numbers),  audio,  graphics,  and  even  video.  For 
example, audio devices can include headsets, cordless 
and  standard  phones,  home  stereos,  and  digital  MP3 
player
[2].  
 
ATTACKS IN BLUETOOTH SECURITY  
Types of attacks in bluetooth security: 
SNARF attack: It is possible for attackers to connect 
to  the  device  without  alerting  the  user,  once  in  the 
system  sensitive  data  can  be  retrieved,  such  as  the 
phone  book,  business  cards,  images,  messages  and 
voice messages. 
  
BACKDOOR attack: The backdoor attack is a higher 
concern  for  Bluetooth  users;  it  allows  attackers  to 
establishing  a  trust  relationship  through  the  "pairing" 
mechanism, but ensuring that the user can not see the 
target's  register  of  paired  devices.  In  doing  this 
attackers have access to all the data on the device, as 
well as access to use the modem or internet; WAP and 
GPRS gateways may be accessed without the owner's 
knowledge or consent.  
 
BLUEBUG  attack:  It  allows  the  attacker  to  make 
premium priced phone calls, allows the use of SMS, or 
connection the Internet. Attackers can not only use the 
device  for  such  fraudulent  exercises  it  also  allows 
identity theft to impersonate the user.  
 
Bluejacking:  Bluejacking  allows  attackers  to  send 
messages to strangers in public via Bluetooth. When the 
phones 'pair' the attacked can write a message to the 
user. Although it may seem harmless at first, there is a 
downside. Once connected the attacker may then have 
access to any data on the user Bluetooth device, which 
has obvious concerns.  
 
DENIAL OF SERVICE Attack: A denial of service is 
“any action, or series of actions, that prevents any part 
of  a  system,  or  its  resources,  from  functioning  in 
accordance with its intended purpose”.  
It can be defined as an intentional attempt to prevent or 
degrade availability of any resources. And it results in 
the prevention of authorized access to resources or the 
delaying of time-critical operations. 
It  is  the  absence  of  availability.  Availability  is  “the 
reliability and timely access to data and resources by 
authorized individuals”.  
 
Availability:  The  property  of  a  system  or  a  system 
resource being accessible and usable upon demand by 
an  authorized  entity,  according  to  performance 
specifications for the system. 
Availability  is  one  of  the  three  tenets  of  computer 
security,  the  other  two  being  confidentiality  and 
integrity as defined below: 
 
Confidentiality: The property that information is not 
made  available  or  disclosed  to  unauthorized 
individuals, entities, or processes. 
 
Integrity: The property that data has not been changed, 
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manner. For systems, integrity is defined as the quality 
that  a  system  has  when  it  can  perform  its  intended 
function in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate 
or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation. 
 
Denial of Service Attack In Bluetooth: A denial of 
service attack can be carried out as flooding messages 
in  bluetooth  devices.  In  flooding  denial  of  service 
attack unnecessary data is sent as much as possible to a 
victim. As a result, network bandwidth is wasted, disk 
space  is  filled  with  unnecessary  data  or  processing 
power is spent for unuseful purpose
[3].  
 
 
Fig. 1:   Denial of Service Attack 
 
  Flooding DoS attacks can be divided into different 
types  as  shown  in  Fig.    1.  In  direct  attacks  spoofed 
packets are sent directly to the victim, here is only one 
attacker  device,  in  the  second  type  of  attack  more 
number  of  devices  will  act  as  the  attacker  that  is  a 
group of attacker devices will be there and the attacker 
devices  will  send  the  requests  to  the  victim  and  the 
victim will be busy in sending the response back to the 
attacker devices and authorized users will not be in the 
position  to  make  connections.  In  the  third  type  the 
pairing  messages  is  sent  by  changing  the  bluetooth 
address of as the address of another bluetooth device 
which want to make the connection with the bluetooth 
device (victim device). When the attacker will send the 
message  by  changing  and  replacing  its  bluetooth 
address  with  the  authorized  bluetooth  address.  The 
victim  will  send  the  authentication  message  and  the 
attacker will send the wrong response and the victims 
will consider it in the failed authentication list . Next 
time  when the authorized user  with the right address 
(whose  address  is  used  by  the  attacker),  send  the 
message for pairing, the victim will ignore the request, 
as  it  is  included  in  the  failed  list  of  devices  and  the 
denial of service will be there for the authorized user as 
a result. 
In  the  fourth  type  of  attack,  if  there  is  already 
paired  device  for  the  victim  device,  the  attacker  will 
pick up the address of the paired device and send the 
messages  for  paring.  As  in  the  bluetooth  technology, 
there  is  no  provision  for  the  checking  of  already 
connected device address before considering the request 
for next pairing massage. The victim will remain busy 
in  sending  the  response  back  to  the  attacker  and  the 
service denial will be there. 
 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
The following are the different ways by which the 
denial of service attack can be avoided in bluetooth 
technology: 
 
When  the  pairing  message  is  sent  by  one  device: 
Denial of service attack can be avoided by storing the 
address  of  bluetooth  device,  which  failed  to 
authenticate  more  than  predefined  number  of 
unsuccessful attempts (Fig.  2). In this way if the victim 
device has a database, which will restrict the access of, 
failed bluetooth devices even for the request for pairing 
process. This can limit the denial of service attack. 
 
When the attacker is sending the messages with the 
address,  which  is  already  connected,  to  bluetooth 
device:  In  this  attack  if  we  are  implementing  the 
security  manager  in  the  connection  establishment 
process,  then  the  security  manager  can  tell  that  the 
device is already being paired (Fig.  2) and there is no 
need for the pairing process and if there are still pairing 
messages there is an attack which is going on. 
 
 
Fig. 2:  Address  list  of  already  paired  devices  and 
failed authentication devices 
 
When the pairing messages sent by more than one 
device: In this type of attack also if in a particular time 
duration, number of unsuccessful paring is more than 
the  particular  predicted  number,  the  bluetooth  device 
can guess that there is denial of service attack attempt is 
there (Fig.  3). And it can send the alert signal to the J. Computer Sci., 3 (7): 546-548, 2007 
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security  manager  to  stop  the  interactions  with  these 
devices. 
 
 
Fig. 3:   Address list of failed authentication devices in 
‘t’ time period  
 
When the attacker is changing the bluetooth address 
of itself with another bluetooth address: In this type 
of attack if the attack changes its bluetooth address with 
another  bluetooth  device  and  sends  the  wrong 
authentication response in reply to the message sent by 
the  verifier  (victim),  the  verifier  will  first  update  its 
failed authentication device list by adding the address 
of the device which is not at present in try to make the 
pairing but the attacker is using its address. The victim 
device  itself  sends  message  to  the  device  after  some 
time duration to authenticate the device, If it will be the 
right device, it will make the connection, otherwise it 
will fail to authenticate (Fig. 4). 
 
 
 
Fig.4:  Repeat the authentication process after 
particular time period  
 
 
 
 
ALGORITHM FOR THE PROPOSED METHOD 
 
Start (pairing) 
{ 
I f (message for pairing) 
Check for the already paired devices list 
If (already paired) 
Alert signal to security manager 
Else  
Send the authentication challenge 
And receive the response back 
If (incorrect response is > specified number of 
attempts) 
Add to the failed list to devices 
If (incorrect response by more number of devices in 
particular time duration) 
Alert the security manger for attack 
If (response is incorrect) 
After ’t’ time  
Send the challenge to the device 
Get back the response 
If (response is correct) 
Remove it from the list of failed devices 
Else 
 No change 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
   Bluetooth has several threats, which range in 
level  of.  These  threats  have  the  ability  to  provide 
criminals with sensitive information on both corporate 
and personal levels. The only way to avoid such threats 
is for manufacturers, distributors, and consumers to be 
provided  with  more  information  on  how  they  are 
committed, current attack activity and how to combat 
them.  The proposed method in this paper by which the 
security manager can avoid the denial of service attack 
in bluetooth. 
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